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 The  analysis of classical economic theory and neo-liberal theory, in conjunction 
with increased data relating to state's participation in the international market place, 
provides crucial insight and avenues for further research  in how democratic and non-
democratic states act towards one another due to economic factors.  
 An assessment of the effects that trade has on states is crucial at a time in which 
interdependence and markets expand. Pushing for transparency in state actions ensures 
international and internal state security, which may help alleviate tensions between states 
due to the anarchic qualities present in international relations.   
 My thesis will analyze the effects of an increased volume in trade on the 
relationship between democratic states and their trade partners. I will demonstrate 
objectively that as trade increases with democratic states, state transparency correlates 
positively. One of  the main factors contributing to this phenomenon is the desire for 
increased trade opportunities between states,  and an increasing trend towards 
transparency to ensure that trade continues unhindered.  
 By using a regression analysis spanning from 2000 to 2012, I argue that as 
democratic states begin to trade with democratic states their transparency index increases 
to ensure the continuation of commerce.  I also argue that a temporal study will further 
demonstrate that trade is the initial catalyst to promote transparency. 
 The objective of the thesis is to demonstrate that democracies can promote 
transparency, and eventually support further democratization, through the promotion of 
trade.  The relevance of the topic is linked to the importance international markets have 
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on the anarchic international system: state growth is invariably tied to their ability to 
compete in an international market. If it can be shown that trade can also change the 
qualities of governments, by promoting transparency, it becomes evident that commerce 




















Chapter I : Introduction 
 
 Continued economic turmoil shapes international trade and influences 
international political discourse. States utilize trade in order to increase their international 
leverage and promote ideals of economic and political interdependence between states. 
For this reason, commerce is fundamental in the promotion of state transparency: it 
ensures continued economic discourse and advances economic and political dialogue. 
 Transparency is crucial in an anarchic international setting, for it allows states to 
better engage other state actors, and it eases political dialogue. Moreover, transparency 
furthers state goals and allows them to correctly predict the behavior state actors may 
take, in such a way an international contract might. However, the risk of transparency 
relies on an efficient way to measure and account for corruption and the information 
provided. Without an objective means of measure, it is hard to distinguish what the 
causes and ramifications of promoting trade between democratic and non-democratic 
entities might be.  
 Increased trade between states promotes the practice of transparency, advancing 
on an international level the  democratization and, internally, the growth of government 
trust and honesty.  Trade pushes for economic and political transparency as a way to ease 
and facilitate commerce between state actors. Furthermore, it functions as a catalyst: an 
increase in trade encourages greater transparency in order to ensure that continued 
commercial activity occurs in a manner which is safe and not susceptible to interruption 
due to government collapse, corruption, or other factors which nontransparent states  
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face.  
 The goal of the thesis is to analyze how increased trade with democratic states 
affects state transparency. An understanding of the effects of economic means of political 
discourse is essential in discussing the evolution of international relations theories. The 
evolution and search for  peaceful means to achieve state economic expansion promote 
the ideals of trade as a means to an end.  
 A theoretical framework will also be necessary in order to cement core concepts, 
which will propose a viable and objective analysis of the information and its sources. 
With this in mind, I have chosen to utilize neo-liberal theory, as presented by Friedrich 
von Hayek, to help define key concepts necessary to understanding the interplay of trade 
and transparency. Economic interdependence, laissez faire policies and other elements of 
liberalism will be discussed on a theoretical standpoint, as they shape the current 
international market. The goals set forth by neo-liberal ideology support the scope of the 
analysis, and in conjunction with classical economic theory, they provide evidence to 
support the findings. The uses of concepts emanating from classical economic theory also 
serve to better understand the data and to define trade in relation to transparency. 
 Defining democracy must also be clarified in order to provide an appropriate 
context and to differentiate the potential trade agreements and demonstrate the findings of 
the thesis. A further theoretical analysis, supported by objective data collected by 
international organizations, such as Global Democracy Ranking and Freedom House, will 
help to distinguish and organize a compendium of data to support the notion of which 
states are to be considered democratic. Identifying which states are and should be 
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considered democratic and what this entails is extremely important in accounting for 
errors due to potential selection bias in the examples that will be used. Furthermore, the 
theoretical framework will aid in rendering an opinion based on objective evidence 
translated into a cross sectional regression analysis.  
 I will also define trade in accordance to specific qualities: I will analyze both the 
overall amount of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) trade and the type of goods in order to 
ensure that both value and type are defined. What the thesis will analyze is reliant on 
increases or decreases in trade.  To ensure the least possible bias, trade will be measured 
initially as a comparable currency value, in an effort to facilitate the measurement of 
potential flux in the state's exports and imports.   
 The type of trade will also be relevant as a comparable source of the actual 
amount of increase in trade: as certain goods trade for unequal amounts, such as the 
difference between the values associated with agricultural and prime resource goods, it is 
important to quantify the value of trade to ensure that currency values and currency flow 
do not alter the findings of the study. 
 In defining the criteria to identify transparency, I will address a further concept 
crucial to the study: this will use the qualities of government corruption, access to 
information and governmental structure to analyze how transparent states act towards one 
another. An example of a measure that accounts for these factors can be found in the form 
of the International Transparency Index as proposed by Transparency International.  
Key examples that I will discuss include the ongoing North American Free Trade 
Agreement; United States and Chinese/Japanese economic and political relations; the 
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foundation of the European Union and its promotion of trade and transparency; and the 
North African Trade Association. I will further address international treaties; the role of 
economic partnerships in ensuring diplomatic means of conduct between states; and the 
role of the government in mediating economic discourse, all of which will demonstrate 
how state transparency is promoted by trade. The thesis moreover will explore issues the 
United States, African States, China, Japan and the European Union face due to factors 
such as trade tariffs, quantitative easing, economic treaties and issues of trade with 
corrupt states.  
Trade in fact can promote political and institutional changes in member states that 
choose to participate. The ability to promote democracy, in turn, can advance ideals set 
forth by the democratic peace theory, as proposed by Michael W. Doyle, relating to the 
cessation of war between states due to their political structure.  
 The core concepts which will be discussed in the thesis must be defined within 
certain parameters if they are to be used as objective variables. For this reason, having 
succinct definitions of each is crucial to furthering the study of the interaction between 
trade among democracies and transparency.  
 The concept of international trade derives from the exchange of goods between 
states. Much more so, trade can be described in its overall monetary value, its labor 
intensity, its gross production and its effect on government GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product). Due to these multiple values, I will, for my thesis, focus on trade as overall 
monetary value of exports and imports, while using overall production and use 
International Production Fragmentation Theory to explain gross production and the 
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technical feasibility of certain states to produce certain goods (Jones, 2000). By using a 
specific and modern conception of the international trade market and its underlying 
mechanisms, I hope to address biases that may originate from the diverging theories of 
trade and better explain the findings within a theoretical and quantitative approach.   
 Another focal variable within the thesis is transparency, which must be carefully 
defined to ensure consistency with the findings. Of the elements which can be used to 
measure government transparency, I choose to focus on the parameters set out by 
Transparency International. Of these, I will focus mainly on using the Corruption Index 
presented by Transparency International. I will use their measurements of  access to 
government information, form of government and state action visibility as additional 
parameters (www.transparency.org, 2014). The use of these features and Transparency 
International's corruption index will allow for an objective measurement of the variable 
tied to transparency.  
 The final variable which must be defined clearly and concisely is democracy.  Due 
to its ancient origin, deriving its meaning from the ancient Greek words demos (people) 
and kratos (power), it is understandable to utilize a modern evolution of the terminology 
to best incorporate a parameter of objectiveness in its measurement (Wilson, 2006) . I 
choose to utilize Tony Smith's definition of democracy, stating  democracy as :  
 a political system institutionalized under the rule of law, wherein 
an autonomous civil society, whose individuals join together voluntarily 
into groups with self-designated purposes, collaborate with each other 
through the mechanisms of political parties and establish through freely 
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contested elections a system of representative government (Smith p.13, 
1996). 
While other theories of democracy exist, many incorporate an aspect of corruption within 
the definition, which may cause a selection bias in the data when analyzed. It is for this 
reason that Smith's definition is useful for the argument proposed for the thesis, as it 


















Chapter II: Literature Review 
 
 To define and arrive at a common understanding of what is meant by 
transparency, Kristin Lord's article “The Surprising Logic of Transparency” is used to 
provide insight, from an International Affairs framework. In accordance to their study, the 
definition which shall be used is : “transparency, defined as mechanisms that facilitate 
the release of information about policies, capabilities, and preferences to outside parties” 
(Lord  1999, p.315).   
 Antonio Argandoña's article, "The United Nations Convention against Corruption 
and Its Impact on International Companies." provides valuable information relating to 
transparency and how it affects corruption in the private sector (Argandoña 2007). 
Because my thesis will focus on state entities, the role of NGOs and companies in 
international trade will not be discussed here.  
 Argandoña posits that an international effort to reduce corruption must work to 
ensure transparency between companies and investors. While the information at hand 
analyzes the necessary framework for companies, Argandoña's work allows for the 
importance of the interaction between transparency and corruption. 
 Kaufman argues in his journal article, “Toward Transparency: New Approaches 
and Their Application to Financial Markets,” that transparency is a requisite for 
international market expansion and the advancement of policy aimed at increasing 
organizational and state transparency is crucial to an increase in trade (Kaufman, 2001).  
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 It is important to note that Kaufman’s argument acknowledges that while 
transparency is a key facet to increased trade, it faces a limiting factor: the difficulty of 
enforcing legislation aimed at increasing transparency sheds light on an issue of national 
reform. Kaufman concludes that transparency in relation to NGOs and transnational 
organizations alone is not sufficient: rather the government must promote transparency 
through regulation and political transparency.  
 As Kaufman states, “Subsuming more specific recommendations on transparency 
in financial markets, made earlier in this article, are therefore broader imperatives to 
improve transparency in governance” (Kaufman 2001, p.55).  
 The fact that transparency is seen as imperative to the discussion of economic 
expansion supports the notion that it correlates to trade. While Kaufman proposes that it 
does so by promoting trade, the argument can also be made that it is rather increased 
trade that leads to transparency. The use of classical economic theory by Kaufman also 
provides indispensable insight on the importance of economic theory within this research 
topic. 
 Marcoullier presents further evidence of the negative effects of non-transparency 
upon trade in his article “Insecurity and The Pattern of Trade: an Empirical Investigation” 
(Marcouiller, 2002). His argument is that insecurity when trading raises the cost of 
product, which in turn constrains trade.  
 He concludes that transparency allows for the lowering of costs, which in turn 
provides evidence in support of the causal relationship between trade and transparency.  
Similar to Kaufman’s' argument, Marcoullier identifies a strong correlation between the 
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two variables.   While Kaufman and Marcoullier attribute transparency as the causal 
element relating to trade, the fact of defining what is meant by trade and the effects of it 
are crucial to concluding that this may actually be the opposite.  
 In Francis Hassan  paper “Dynamic Relations between International Equity and 
Currency Markets:  The Role of Currency Order Flow”, the literature review sets out to 
demonstrate how information tied to currency markets tends to alter the international 
currency market. Their scope is to use various other economic studies in order to prove 
their hypothesis:  
there are important, yet not well understood dynamic relationships 
between international equity and currency markets and that these are 
driven by information spillover via the mechanism of currency order flow 
(Hassan pg.1 2006). 
 The article aims to fill in gaps in previous research by using various studies to 
identify and label concepts relating to how trade is defined. Currency fluctuation is 
important in that it accounts for error. Hassan's article also allows us to see how aspects 
of international affairs theory are being used in conjunction with theories presented by 
classical economic theory. 
The paper in fact “contributes in several ways to the international finance 
literature, in general, and, in particular, to the literature that examines the 
interdependency between international financial markets” (Hassan pg.6 2006).  
The use of Jorion's  research on “The exchange-rate exposure of US 
multinationals” sets up an empirical approach and promotes a means to measure data 
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quantitatively, which may then be aggregated to findings and previous research (Jorion, 
2001).  Similar to the ideals set forth by Antonio  Argandoña's article, Jordon’s discussion 
of the parameters by which multinationals trade helps prove the necessity of transparency 
within the international market. While the role of multinationals is fundamental to 
international trade, this shall not be discussed within the thesis. 
Evans and Lyons (2002) work, “Order flow and exchange rate dynamics,” can 
further help us assess the validity of information and the transparency of the data in use. 
Their pivotal article explains how currency fluctuation and a lack of transparency affect 
trade: “unexpected currency order flow is the vehicle that transmits information between 
markets” (Lyon et al pg.175, 2002). 
By using the research set forth, Francis B. comes to define currency flow as “the 
net purchase of a foreign currency” (Francis pg.170, 2002). 
A further study by King, Sentana, and Wadhwani also serves in comparison to 
define the effects of shifting currency markets.  Criticism of the methods used to gather 
information and set up the studies becomes an area of interest, leading to the further 
question of: 
 ...how well the linkage(s) from currency to equity markets is understood, 
even though considerable effort has been expended in establishing this 
relationship(s) (King pg. 22, 1994). 
 The construction of this paradigm ensures a theoretical framework and explains 
the definition chosen for the terminology in relation to the scope of the thesis.  
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A study conducted by Bollerslev in his article “Intra Day and Inter Market 
Volatility in Foreign Exchange Rates” is used to create a theoretical foundation to explain 
and specify what the effects may be and to begin to define the concept of currency and 
trading information transfer. The importance of understanding how economic 
transparency may affect political transparency helps explicate the argument that 
contradicts the findings suggested by Kaufman. Bollerslev presents data, taken over time, 
which suggests that the initial factor which occurs is trade rather than transparency 
(Bollerslev 1990).  
Rajamaran's article “Fiscal Transparency” demonstrates the effects that the IMF 
and large banking industries' regulations may have on a state, in this case India, which 
may initially seem transparent (Rajamaran 2002).  
The use of technical language to describe the actions national banking industries 
and international NGOs take to ensure transparency once again demonstrates the cross 
field area of study. As Rajamaran states “The RORB (Reserve Bank of India) correctly 
distinguishes between fiscal transparency, macroeconomic fiscal balance, and 
microeconomic fiscal efficiency, in the following words:  
Fiscal transparency is quite distinct from these two important aspects of 
fiscal policy since it focuses on the more limited issue of whether 
sufficient information on the fiscal situation is being provided in a timely 
fashion to enable observers, including especially financial market 
participants, to make an accurate assessment of the under-lying fiscal 
position(Rajamaran 2002, p. 4882). 
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By providing a technical definition of transparency in terms of financial and 
economic concepts, Rajamaran provides insight into classical economic theory and a 
comparable definition to match international affairs theory of government transparency. 
In order to prevent a bias caused by tariff barriers, the importance of regional 
trade entities must be acknowledged. Rose's article “One Money, One Market” introduces 
tariff barriers and the unification of currencies as elements that should be considered 
when analyzing trade patterns between states. The existence of trading blocs and other 
organizations, such as the IMF, that regulate and create provisions to limit trade are 
crucial in understanding how trade distribution may occur on a global scale (Rose pg.133, 
2000).  
As regional entities must be considered, so must the work of IGOs which impact 
how trade and legislation relating to commerce occur. Glennerster and Shin's article 
“Does Transparency Pay?” develops a theory which promotes transparency through the 
work of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Shin pg.211,  2008). Shin et al posit that 
countries that face lesser tariffs, and thus lesser costs of trade and facilitation, tend to 
become more transparent to continue on benefiting from trade legislation which favors 
ease of trade. As their findings suggest, 
We further find that there is a diminishing marginal benefit of 
transparency; that is, countries that start out the least transparent gain the 
most through the reforms. In addition, there is evidence that increased 
transparency is particularly beneficial for countries with smaller and less 
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liquid debt markets where, we conjecture, market participants have less 
information initially. (Shin  2008, p.206) 
 The importance of these findings puts forth thought to how developing states must 
be treated when analyzing data sets. Due to the fact that they may draw the largest benefit 
from transparency due to increasing trade, Shin  presents a potential bias to our study.  
However, Shin does point out that an initial lack of information in smaller markets may 
be a reason for why transparency may initially be a requisite to increase trade. 
 Xinyuan Dai presents in his article “Political Regimes and International Trade: the 
Democratic Difference Revisited” evidence that ideological differences do not dictate 
how states choose to trade.  
 The elimination of governance as a defining factor for the choice states make with 
whom to trade is crucial to eliminate possible other factors that may decide why states 
choose to trade with each other (Dai 2002).  In turn, the fewer factors that decide and 
alter trade statistics, the stronger the correlation that can be derived from the effect of 
trade on transparency.  
 Rather than promote government change, the argument that trade promotes 
transparency is strengthened by Xinyuan's findings: 
 Regardless of the preferences of the decision makers, pairs of 
democracies tend to agree upon lower trade barriers than pairs comprised 
of a democracy and an autocracy. (Dai 2002, pg.163).  
 These findings point us to Hollyer's study “Democracy and Transparency.” By 
assessing the transparency of democracies against other forms of governments using a 
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demonstrative model, Hollier’s findings present the idea that informed decision and an 
educated voting procedure tend to correlate positively with transparency. In relation to 
Xinyuan's findings, this suggests that transparency affects the increase in trade (Hollier 
pg. 33, 2011). Hollier cements the importance of a democratic system, as defined by this 
study, to the growth of government transparency. 
Attention to the difference between the protocols enacted by the WTO and other 
trade blocs is necessary to further the analysis of the difference between developing and 
developed states. Hurd, in his book International Organizations (2011), provides a 
legislative analysis of how the WTO and regional organizations function on an 
international level. 
The use of Article I, regarding the ideal of “most favored nation” is crucial to 
understanding how the GATT is upheld and acts in relation to the premises set forth by 
the WTO (Hurd 2011, pg. 41) Hurd states that 
 any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties(Hurd 2011, pg. 63). 
 The concept of most favored nation acts as a safeguard to ensure that each nation 
trades with member states equally. The notion of equivalence of products from states 
allows for each member state to trade with each other indifferent of where the product 
originates.  
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However, it is Article III of the World Trade Organization Charter which most 
affects developing countries. Declaring that “the products of the territory of any other 
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any other kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products” (Hurd 2011, pg. 63), Article III regulates tariffs and sets the amount 
which may be charged for the export and import of goods. While these may theoretically 
allow for the equal trade of products, developmental costs, industrialization and diversity 
of products must be accounted for. 
 However, as Mitshusita points out in his article, “The World Trade Organization: 
Law, practice and policy”(2006), the WTO trade agreements are not necessarily fixed, 
allowing for openness of interpretation under strict cases and for favored trades to occur: 
“the WTO provides that only the Ministerial Conference and the General Council have 
the power to adopt interpretations of the WTO agreements by a three quarters majority of 
the Members.” (Matsushita 2006, pg.47) The General Assembly may authorize changes 
and bilateral agreements, however these tend to occur when larger members gain value 
from such trades.  While the system is set out to treat all equally, it grants leeway under 







Chapter III: Methodology 
 
Data and Analysis 
 
 To test my hypothesis I examine the effects of the independent variable—
increased trade—on the dependent variable—state transparency—in multiple countries 
since the turn of the century.  The data originates from multiple sources, including the 
United Nations Commission on Trade and Development’s trade analysis and information 
System (TRAINS); Transparency International's Corruption Index surveys; World Trade 
Organization's International Trade and Market Access; World Bank's World Trade 
Indicators; and International Trade Center’s Trade Map.  The chosen sample size is 
ample, as trade information is abundant for the states involved in the research design. The 
data is limited by the fact that certain years of trade export were missing; however by 
using a cross sectional design, the error originating from this aspect of the research is 
mitigated. 
 I have chosen to analyze democratic and non-democratic states because non-
democratic states, being less transparent, provide inaccurate data. Both systematic bias 
and reporting bias by the states would alter the data and cause for inaccurate inferences to 
be made. Trade legislation can further skew data. States which use  tariff barriers to 
regulate and safeguard intra-national and trading block exports pose an issue to the 
analysis of incoming mercantile statistics. Although it supports the argument that trade is 
favored with transparent states, bias once again limits the relevancy of the data obtained 
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by international organizations. The use of mean averaging of trade and transparency 
indexes will allow for a stronger cross sectional analysis and once again will limit errors 
present in data collection. Due to the large sample size, the range and standard deviation 
of the group helps limit bias by providing a large N value, increasing generalizability and 
minimizing error due to small sample size.  
 For the sake of the thesis, democracy, transparency and trade must be defined to 
be able to quantitatively explain these parameters beyond a theoretical framework. 
Factors used to define democracy include free press, an electoral process, the structure 
and strength of government and civil society. Transparency tends to be closely linked to 
democracy: while this may raise a bias, the factor that we are accounting for democratic 
states offers a mitigating variable to the selection bias process. To resolve the issue, I 
employ a variable to define non-democratic and democratic states.   
 I will also analyze non-democratic states in order to support the argument that 
democratic states’ increased transparency is due to the increased facilitation of trade. This 
will help assert that it is not transparency that eases trade. For this reason non-democratic 
states will also be analyzed. 
 The sample size encompasses developed and developing countries, with the 
second being largely present due to developing countries being more numerous. The 
inclusion of the European Union and its member states as distinctive statistics brought 
forth a problem of double counting. To resolve the issue, the European Union will be 
analyzed in relation to its member states and its internal trading system. Similarly, 
NAFTA and other trading blocks are analyzed in relation to its member states and 
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separately as international trading regimes trading with other external states. While it may 
be possible to analyze each element separately, that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 While it may be possible to further reduce counting bias by implementing single 
state trade as a measure of intra-state reduction of corruption, it is not necessary for this 
thesis. This whoever may present a potential bias in the data and may further reduce the 
sample size due to availability of data. However, to account for such a finding is not 
necessary for the argument proposed by the thesis due to the sample size and an aspect of 
regional analysis.  
  The use of multiple trade statistics, however, allows the decrease of systematic 
bias and countries reporting false claims. Furthermore, the use of multiple sources which 
tend to be international organizations—such as the World Bank, the United Nations and 
the World Trade organization—allows for better estimates of import and export data. The 
issue of transparency is similarly analyzed by using the Transparency International's 
Corruption Index, Amnesty International human rights statistics, and United Nation's 
country reports. Factors analyzed to assert transparency include government electoral 
processes. 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
 I employ the dependent variable Y, transparency.  Three facets of the variables are 
analyzed, which group to form the dependent variable. The first is government 
corruption, defined as C, measured as a ranked nominal average and created by a cross 
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reference of rankings of corruption statistics collected by Amnesty International, 
Transparency International and the United Nations. 
 A further measure of transparency is determined by government political strength 
and its electorate process. This is measured by a nominal ranking system representing 
states, starting from 1 and finishing at 23 states, with information provided by the United 
Nations, Transparency International and Amnesty International.   
 Government human rights, economic legislation and adherence to international 
law, labeled as H, are used to further assess the transparency of member states. Special 
importance is given to the rights of free speech, free press, and voting procedures as well 
as to the adherence to international standards of human rights law. This information, 
provided by Amnesty International, is analyzed through a binomial distribution, 
indicating with a 1 a state which adheres to human rights, and with a 0 a state that does 
not.  
 Human Rights Watch survey data is also used to cross reference the information. 
Due to the fact that the United States is not included within the surveys, Amnesty 
International and the European Court of Human rights reports are included relating to the 
United States and other countries in the sample group. To avoid complication, a 
composite measure will be used to simplify and measure data relating to transparency.  
 By subdividing the dependent variable of Y, transparency, a definition and process 
of identification allows for the mitigation of bias. To further decrease bias and assert the 
difference between democratic and non-democratic states, I employ the Global 
Democracy Ranking of Democracy Index, which utilizes a nominal ordinal system of 
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states, ranking each in relation to the other in accordance to how democratic they are.  
 Labeled as D, the use of the democracy variable is a robustness check for 
correlating democratic process to my variables and helps to check if the data is relevant 
to both democracies and non-democratic states.  It is crucial to divide the variable, for 





 I employ multiple independent variables to examine whether a country abides by 
trading regulations and to measure the quantity and types of trades which states take part 
in. Trade volume is measured by raw quantity of export goods, a continuous sequential 
distribution measured in dollars.  Due to currency changes, I have chosen to use the 
dollar as a counting measure to minimize bias arising from a free floating currency 
market. Furthermore, this allows for an efficient organization of data which can be cross-
analyzed through time.  
 Export and import gross value, represented by X1, is an interval level measure 
relating to the amount, in millions of dollars, which states use in the form of trade. It uses 
an aggregate sum including yearly export and import values. This will help show a 
pattern through time and, in accordance with my thesis, should demonstrate that 
transparency increases as a country increases its trade.  
 The magnitude of data over time is important to note as a cross sectional study, for 
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some data points were lacking due to the failure of states to report accurate measures of 
their export during given time periods or due to lack of government transparency. The 
choice to use export volume rather than type of export shall be discussed subsequently. 
 The choice to  analyze the type of export as product rather than as service goods is 
to ensure continuity in the scope of the study. While service export is an interesting facet 
of the international trade, due to its affiliation to non-governmental entities, such as large 
profit and non-profit organizations, it may provide bias in the way states directly trade 
with one another.  
  Of further importance this differentiation is to account for the divergent trade 
pattern of developed countries in contrast to developing ones. Developing countries, as 
suggested by the WTO figures relating to trade profiles, tend to trade in agricultural 
products.  
 This in turn favors lower trade costs in terms of dollar. However the quantity of 
trade and the adherence to treaties is not affected. Many states which are developing tend 
to score lower in transparency, however this may be due to the factors surrounding the 
type of exports. By interpreting this data as separate, this may help prove that even if 
trade value is not as high in developing countries, allowing these states to remain 
competitive on a global level helps create transparency in governments. Further attention 
to the type of export also identifies which forms of trade tend to occur and which 




Control Variables and Formula 
 
 Certain factors affect the way states trade. One such factor is the use of tariffs by 
developing countries as a source of revenue. Trading blocks, as an example, uses reduced 
tariffs within the region to alleviate costs and allow member states to remain competitive. 
Inflation presents a similar issue, as it might affect the overall amount, in millions of 
dollars, that states trade.  
 Rather than focus on currency or quantitative easing, the thesis will instead 
disregard these elements due to the difficulty to ascertain and account for the effects these 
may have on state transparency. 
 Similarly, while tariffs and treaty legislation may present potential biases, these 
elements are beyond the scope of the thesis. It will, however, be useful to analyze the 
effects that regional tariffs may have on the states with which countries choose to trade. 
 I also consider the important topic of fixed versus fluctuating currency rates. 
Certain states may enact stricter tariff legislation and import and export policies to protect 
their currency. Furthermore certain states may choose to trade at a fixed rate of exchange, 
sometimes even adopting a common currency. While it can be argued that tariff easing 
and trading blocs may ease trading prospects, I choose to address these issues within the 
regional chapters. 
 Form of government must also be considered. Findings by Kaufman (2001) 
suggest that democracies tend to trade more with other democracies. This factor could 
produce a bias towards how states choose to trade. Furthermore, in accordance to the 
27 
definition of democracy provided, democracies tend to be more transparent due to their 
chosen form of government. While this is not universally true, the nominal variable X2  
will be used to account for government type. 
  The importance of identifying the government type is not solely for the sake of 
reducing bias, but also helps support the hypothesis by providing a further explanation to 
why democratic states may choose to trade with one another more often than with non-
democratic states. 
 Whether or not a state is a developing country must also be accounted for. As 
mentioned in the literature review, developing states may have a greater effect due to 
trade. Moreover, state trading volume may be reduced due to the type of export which the 
state provides.  
 Developing states, which tend to focus on agricultural product, may produce as a 
whole a lesser amount of revenue from export trade and be unable to import as many 
goods as other more developed states.  The nominal variable X3 will be used to account 
for potential bias arising from the differing economic models of developed versus 
developing countries.  
 Furthermore, developing states may be less transparent due to issues tied to the 
process of state formation. It is however, difficult to analyze and objectively measure 
how a state forms. While this bias may exist, it is beyond the scope of the proposed 
hypothesis and may warrant further study. 
 In a similar fashion, a counting bias may arise from the use of intra-state trade 
within regional blocks rather than externally. For this reason, state trade will be defined 
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as global trade. However, to ensure an appropriate conclusion to the observations, the use 
of regional analysis of the data should help determine what effects elements such as state 
proximity and membership in trade organizations may have on gross export and import 
trade and subsequently transparency.  
 The final nominal variable, X4 , will account for whether a state faces restrictions 
to trade due to political sanctions or other circumstances such as internal governmental 
disarray.  In asserting the validity of the proposed hypothesis, it is crucial to understand 
that certain countries already face legislative action against their ability to trade, such as 
North Korea, Cuba and Iran.  
 It is important to note, however, that many of these states face such action due to 
their lack of transparency before the sanctions were enacted or due to breaches to 
international covenants.  
 The study shall take the form of a linear regression model. The formula used will 
account for the data over time and take the form of : 
Y(h,c,d)=B+BX1 +BX2... BX4+Error 
 The means of the dependent variable will be described in a nominal ranked chart, 
from most transparent to least transparent states. Given the study is a cross sectional one, 
the bias of dependence will be dealt with by using trade data originating from a year 
before to compare to the outcome variable, transparency, a year after. The use of a 
regression model allows us to analyze a large set of data, in this case 23 countries, and to 
do so in a manner which is easily comparable between each state.  
 To ensure that the data is easily comparable, the use of both percentage growth 
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and total volume will be used. Percentage growth will be useful to test robustness of the 
data and to facilitate comparison of each states' change in volume of trade in relation to 





















Chapter IV: Data Analysis and Observation 
 
 Analysis of the interaction of the two variable, transparency and trade, is crucial 
as a starting point to ensure a proper understanding of the goals set out by the hypothesis.  
The data sets utilized for this preliminary analysis will consist of information relating to 
the transparency index of states in relation to their increased trade spanning a defined 
period of time.  The initial use of two separate charts relating to the changes of the two 
variable over time is necessary to initially assess causation between the two variable. The 
data will also yield information relating to the changes over time which alter the 
corruption index and the level of state transparency respectively. 
   To further test the validity of the hypothesis, states will be subdivided regionally 
and case studies will be utilized to explain how the results of certain regions may vary. 
The initial chart will account for the case studies being used hereafter. The implications 
of state democratic index will be discussed later in accordance with the findings. 
  Chart A1 shows the Corruption Perception Index of the states selected for the 
case study in relation to its development spanning from 2001 to 2013 . The resulting 
score of 1 indicates a state which did not allow access to its transparency index, thus 
pertaining to states which at the time has decreased access to international information 
relating to its actions or data which could not be found by Transparency International.  
 The choice of using state data which may be lacking scores for specific years is 
due to the fact that during those years, a lack of reporting may suggest the state was to be 
considered non transparent. 
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  The choice to use Transparency International's data set is due to the use of 
multiple data sources which the organization uses to aggregate and account for their 
corruption index, resulting in a lesser bias and a larger sample pool of data.  Furthermore, 
by utilizing measures which account for form of government, voting structure and 
perceived corruption, Transparency International's Perceived Corruption Index (PCI) also 
focuses on the definitions used by this thesis to assess the transparency of states. 
 




 The numeric value assigned to the CPI score is representative of a scale of 1 to 
100, with most corrupt states scoring a value of 1. It is a nominal scale measurement of 
the results of several studies conducted by different organizations on the perceived 
transparency and corruption level of states.   















Yearly Corruption Perception Index ( Nominal Value)
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
Germany 78 79 80 79 80 79 78 80 82 82 77 73 74
France 71 71 70 68 69 69 73 74 75 71 69 63 67
Japan 74 74 80 78 77 73 75 76 73 69 70 71 71
Canada 81 84 87 89 87 87 87 85 84 85 87 90 89
United States 73 73 71 71 75 73 72 73 76 75 75 77 76
Spain 59 65 62 61 61 65 67 68 70 71 69 71 70
South Korea 55 56 54 54 55 56 51 51 50 45 43 45 42
Mexico 34 34 30 31 33 36 35 33 35 36 36 36 37
Italy 69 42 39 39 43 48 52 49 50 48 53 52 55
Greece 40 36 34 35 38 47 46 44 43 43 43 42 42
Argentina 36 35 30 29 29 29 29 29 28 25 25 28 35
Portugal 62 63 61 60 58 61 65 66 65 63 66 63 63
India 36 36 31 33 34 34 35 33 29 28 28 27 27
South Africa 42 43 41 45 47 49 51 46 45 46 44 48 48
D.R. Of Congo 22 21 20 20 19 17 19 22 23 23 22 1 1
Morocco 37 37 34 34 33 35 35 32 32 32 33 37 1
Nigeria 25 27 24 24 25 27 22 22 19 16 14 16 10
Brazil 42 43 38 37 37 35 35 33 37 39 39 40 40
Russia 28 28 24 21 22 21 23 25 24 28 27 27 23
Ukraine 25 26 23 24 22 25 27 28 26 22 23 24 21
China 40 39 36 36 36 36 35 33 32 34 34 35 35
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 Chart A1.1 shows the averages for each state's Corruption Perception Index, their 
range and their respective standard deviation. 




Most democratic and transparent states within the data set, for which information was 
present and thus a nominal Corruption Perception Index value of 1 was not assigned, do 
not have a large range deviation for the nominal values assigned to it. As an example, the 
United States values fluctuate between a CPI of 71 and 77, indicating a range of 6 within 
the CPI index relating to the years encompassing 2001 to 2013.  
 The same holds true for  the majority of case studies for which data was readily 
available.  However  Italy, as an example, has one of the largest fluctuations with a range 
of 30 CPI points. It is for this reason that while the data may indicate certain findings, a 
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Germany 78.5 79 79 2.67 9
France 70 71 71;69 3.14 7
Japan 73.9 74 73 3.25 11
Canada 86.3 87 87 2.46 9
United States 73.8 73 73 1.95 6
Spain 66.1 67 61;71 4.21 12
South Korea 50.5 51 56;55;54;51 5.13 14
Mexico 34.3 35 36 2.1 7
Italy 49.2 48 39;48 7.95 30
Greece 41.0 42 43 4.12 13
Argentina 29.8 29 29 3.52 11
Portugal 62.8 63 63 2.39 8
India 31.6 33 36;34;28;27 3.43 9
South Africa 45.8 45 46;45;48 2.86 10
D.R. Of Congo 17.7 20 22 7.6 22
Morocco 31.7 32 32 9.41 36
Nigeria 20.8 25 27;24;22 5.38 17
Brazil 38.1 37 37 2.84 10
Russia 24.7 27 28 2.66 7
Ukraine 24.3 24 25;24;23;22 2.09 7
China 35.5 36 36 2.18 8
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check of the democratic index of states is necessary to discern if the findings are being 
altered by the form of government the state may have.  
 Even non-democratic states with a  CPI value of 1, as an example the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, differ by a range of 21 points on the nominal scale. 
The range of that data thus seems to remain stable for most states, with some states 
having a larger fluctuation than others, remaining however within a reasonable range. It is 
interesting to note that the largest fluctuation is tied to a state member of the European 
Union and supposedly democratic, Italy. This will be further discussed in Chapter 5 
relating to the form of government of the selected states.  
 An analysis of the mean of the states' data points and their respective standard 
deviations provides useful insight into how the data aggregates over time and the 
fluctuation states have had over time of their Perceived Corruption Index.   Similar to the 
information provided by the range of each data set, the relationship between the mean 
and the standard deviation displays strong evidence supporting the lack of CPI fluctuation 
in state scores over time for the majority of states. 
 It shows as mean scores tend to rise, the standard deviation tends to diminish. 
What this may initially indicate that transparency within the state may eventually cap, 
with minor fluctuations due to other factors. Of these factors, the form of government 
may be focal to the discussion and will be further analyzed in Chapter 5.  It is interesting 
to once again notice that two of the democratic states which have a high standard 
deviation are both part of the European Union, in this case Italy and Spain.   
 Furthermore, states located in Africa and other developing countries tend to also 
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display higher fluctuations with their Corruption Perception Index values. What this may 
indicate is that developing countries may be more prone to corruption, leading to issues 
with transparency and form of governance. 
 As an example, Morocco's data has a mean score of 31.7 on its CPI, however it 
also has a standard deviation of 9.41. It is important to denote, however, that Morocco 
also had a CPI value of 1 in 2001, which may alter the findings and bias the data.  
However, in a similar fashion, Nigeria portrays a mean score of 20.8 and has a standard 
deviation of 5.38. While the standard deviation for this state is less than that of Morocco, 
it is relatively larger than those found in more developed countries. 
 Important to note is also a reduced mean score for developing states, which tends 
to support the concept that form of government and economic growth may be strongly 
correlated with the transparency states may have.  
 The median and the mode provide information relating to the stability of state 
corruption over time. States with similar median and modes would show a state that, 
during the time period, scored similar values. Not only, but each measure further 
complements the statistics tied to standard deviation to demonstrate how the data 
subdivides itself between states.  
 The important facet to delineate is states which have different modes: these states 
tend to score similarly in changing time periods. While the range of the scores is not 
major for most states, Italy, India, Nigeria and Spain show a dramatic change of scores, 
showing either a growth or decay of transparency over time and a continuation of 
practices by the states which caused these results.  
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 These initial findings will help strengthen the argument within the upcoming 
chapters to the effects that trade may have on how a state chooses to act within the 
international scene.  
 The information tied to the Corruption Perception Index over time helps show 
which periods of time, for each state, had a decrease or increase in transparency. The next 
chart will instead look at trade over time to identify temporal patterns between 
transparency and trade.  
 Chart B1 analyzes increases in export and import trade, in millions of dollars, not 
accounting for service trade, between state's trade over time.  It does so from a period of 
time spanning from 2001 to 2013, using the WTO's import and export statistics to 
account for export good trades in the given years.   
 The choice to exclude data relating to service trade is due to the difficulty of 
describing service trade as a state activity and differentiate it from private industry. By 
using goods as the main focus, the thesis aims to address inter-state trade and reduce bias 
caused by private sector trade. 
 Furthermore, current US dollar values were used to diminish bias due to currency 
change and fluctuation in measuring the trade over time. While changes in currency do 







Chart B1: State Export and Import Trade In Millions of Dollars over time
3
 
 An initial analysis of the data relating to the increase of volume in trade 
determines that over time, each state tends to increase positively import and export trade. 
While there are years in which certain states trade less, as an example Argentina in 2009, 
these periods will be focal to analyzing how the CPI changed during these periods. The 
overall trend of increasing trade is also due to elements mentioned in Chapter 4: while the 
current value of the dollar was used to account for inflation, currency order flow, 
industrialization and mechanization of industry are some factors which may cause for 
trade to increase over time.  
 For this reason it becomes important to analyze which states are developing and 
                                                 
3 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database 
Yearly Product Export and Import Trade (In Millions of Dollars) 
















Germany 2640046 2568326 2728855 2313738 2046388 2631238 2376197 2014791 1747987 1625629 1356170 1106114 1057764
France 1260320 1243123 1316502 1134837 1045654 1333035 1190473 1037787 967552 923051 790879 660981 651987
Japan 1548263 1684411 1678564 1463833 1132700 1543946 1336570 1225789 1110807 1020217 854747 753920 752585
Canada 932489 930160 914975 790171 646001 875482 810881 747178 682886 596693 517760 479893 487149
United States 3910339 3881246 3746184 2661339 3247679 3456929 3168602 2944044 2633788 2340555 2027821 1893333 1908280
Spain 654361 632588 683157 581434 520556 702296 642598 542413 481430 440954 364749 290792 271310
South Korea 1075216 1067454 1079627 891596 686619 857282 728335 634848 545657 478308 372644 314597 291591
Mexico 771154 751120 710637 608510 471227 609569 562067 513437 442447 390240 340435 333769 324664
Italy 994963 989906 1082045 934350 822014 1104667 1011544 859430 757925 709083 596852 502442 481140
Greece 98647 98686 101293 94863 89917 118962 102110 84368 71714 68068 58234 41984 44526
Argentina 157028 149435 157888 124635 94458 127480 100485 80698 69040 57021 43400 34640 46863
Portugal 138066 130311 142064 127155 115874 151553 104964 115434 102659 90735 78957 66064 63598
India 778292 785399 767367 576584 422111 515860 379529 300218 242486 176424 131521 105767 93753
South Africa 222446 227119 233304 188182 301392 182422 158234 136890 113930 99612 76230 58990 57506
Democratic Republic of Congo 12600 12400 12100 9800 7400 8700 6500 5597 5093 4310 2873 2213 1670
Morocco 66912 66318 65926 53152 46935 40690 47350 36724 31980 27747 23028 19713 18182
Nigeria 150000 166000 170000 128235 90648 136225 101436 85249 71221 52795 44865 44716 42983
Brazil 492626 475968 492986 393452 286672 380319 287294 233645 196157 163111 124084 110162 116669
Russia 867610 864701 845842 649264 495191 763467 577889 467832 369232 280589 211999 168267 155648
Ukraine 140276 153171 151054 112389 85269 152489 109914 83407 70364 61663 46087 34934 32040
China 4160009 3867119 3641865 2974001 2207535 2563260 2176572 1760439 1421906 1154555 850988 620766 509651
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the form of government to ensure an accurate perception of the changes occurring. 
 Furthermore, it is important to utilize a percentage growth index, over time, to see 
the rate at which different states have increased or decreased trade. The reason for this is 
to provide an easier statistic to compare to the growth or decay of the Corruption 
Perception Index, rendering the information easier to compare.  Chart B1.1 Provides the 
percentage increment growth for each state over time. 




 The choice to use a percentage index and to then use the total values is crucial: as 
trade tends to increase over time for all states, the value of using a measure of the growth 
factor, rather than the raw number, helps to see what trends states have in accordance to 
the shift in their Corruption perception index.  
 The constant growth can be attributed to multiple factors: inflation and 
                                                 
4 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database 
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quantitative easing are two potential biases which were mentioned. To try and minimize 
the systematic bias, the use of a percentage index is used. Furthermore it is also easier to 
measure in relation to the corruption index due to a similar unit measurement.  
 To further the point, Graph B1.2 shows the percentage growth of the four states 
with the lowest CPI  means. The reason to show this is to show the importance of not 
solely accounting for total volume, but to demonstrate the relationship between the 
development of economy and CPI. 





 As Graph B1.2 shows, states with similar Corruption Perception Indexes tend to 
have a similar trade growth pattern. What this indicates is a correlation between the two 
variables for states with similar CPI scores. Each state tends to follow a similar trend of 
                                                 
5 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database 
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growth and decay. To further the point, an analysis of the states with the highest CPI 
ratings is shown in Graph B1.3. 
 




 The choice to use the least and most transparent states is to demonstrate that trade 
varies in a similar fashion between states.  Similar trend lines are present in both graphs, 
solidifying the concept that trade changes affect state CPI regardless of the score.  
 It is important to observe that states which are more transparent tend to have 
larger growth peaks.  The percentage changes in Graph B1.3 tend to be more severe, 
suggesting that the effects of economic growth have a smaller effect on transparency, 
once again suggesting that as transparency increases, the effects trade has on Corruption 
Perception Indexes may decrease.  
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 A further point to note is the data values relating to trade for the years of 2009 to 
2010. Overall, most states had a negative trade growth within these two years: this may 
be due to external factors, highlighted by the fact that the data shows a general global 
decline in trade.  
It is now necessary to visually represent the two variables to show if a correlation exists.  
 What the two separate data sets initially suggest is a consistent value of corruption 
within states: as time progresses, minor fluctuations between the corruption index tends 
to coordinate with consistent trading patterns found in Graph B1.2 and B1.3.   
 As states increase trade, in a majority of cases transparency tends to increase. 
While the rate at which transparency increases seems affected by other factors other than 
trade, it is safe to assume that there is a positive correlation between CPI and trade.  
  A positive correlation between state transparency and trade will be demonstrated 
in Chart C1 using the United States as a sample of evidence, further covered in Chapter 8 
relating to the Americas.  As the graph will show, trade tends to increase in the United 
States while the CPI index tends to stabilize and sway slightly in accordance with the 











 As mentioned previously, the important facet to look at is at how much US trade 
differs from year to year due to an increase or decrease of the CPI index. As an example, 
the differential in trade during the 2010 to 2012 period is one of the largest for the USA, 
matching with an increase in CPI rating.  
 Similarly, the period following sees an increase in US production followed by a 
consistent growth as transparency increases. It is important to notice that the trend lines 
shown by the increase and decrease of CPI changes are due to the effects of trade: as 
trade increases, the effects are seen the year afterward, demonstrating the causality of 
trade upon transparency. 
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 Finally it is important to note that while the initial part of the chart tends to show a 
decline in transparency as volume of trade increases, this may be due to the difference in 
percentage growth: it is in fact the case that during the initial period, negative percentage 
growth in 2001 to 2002 and a small growth of 7.89% between 2002 and 2003 differ 
amply and may account for a plateauing of the value of corruption within a state.  
For the purpose of comparing, Graph C1.1 analyzes Russia as a state with a lower overall 
average Corruption Perception Index. The choice to do so is to demonstrate consistency 
in the findings. 




 In a similar fashion, Russia shows a consistent increase of transparency directly 
correlated with trade during the 2001 to 2003 period. However, as speculated previously, 
the changes Russia has in Corruption Perception Index seem less affected by trade growth 
                                                 
 8 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database ; http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
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in Graph C1.1. The United States, on the other hand, has a CPI index graph which has a 
larger range of motion in relation to the economic changes over time. 
 However it is important to note that during period between 2009 and 2010 Russia 
and the United States differs immensely. While the United States shows changes which 
are consistent with the hypotheses proposed, Russia shows a sharp decline in growth with 
no adverse effects on its Corruption Perception Index. What this may point out is that 
trade may also have a reduced effects on transparency when states score generally lower 
CPIs.  
 What this might suggest is that there may be a maximum value at which volume 
of trade effects can be felt in relation to CPI, after which other factors may take part in 
determining the transparency of the state.  
 This is also supported by the findings shown in graphs B1.2 and B1.3: while trade 
growth is similar between states, it seems that the lower the overall CPI score is, the less 
it is affected by trade. However form of government and whether a state is considered 
developed may play fundamental roles in supporting the proposed hypothesis.  
 It may also suggest that a determined minimum amount of change in trade is 
necessary for the effects of it to be felt on the transparency and CPI of a state, while 
larger changes may be due to global situations beyond the scope of the thesis.  
 As proposed by my hypothesis, a consistent growth in export and import trade 
should mean that overall there should be an improvement by states of their perceived 
corruption index. An initial comparison of CPI values originating in 2001 to 2013 
generally support these findings. Most states tend to improve their CPI rating or remain 
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within a unit or two of standard deviation.  
 A simple analysis of these first two charts is not sufficient to fully arrive at an 
answer to the hypothesis: while the results seem to indicate a level of correlation, 
understanding how credible the data is imperative and warrants further study in the 
upcoming chapters. The data is reliably showing a correlation between trade volume and 
CPI score: as the volume of trade and percentage growth increase, states tend to change 
in CPI accordingly. Due to the way the changes are portrayed over time, it is safe to 
assume that the changes are due to the alterations in volume of trade rather than by 
change in transparency. By being able to define which of the variables is responsible for 














Chapter V: Democratic and Developing States 
  
 Chapter 5 covers the concepts of the form of government and economic and 
industrial development of the states studied above to provide further information relating 
to the states chosen and their interaction with trade. The reason these two variables have 
been chosen as potential biases is due to the effect each of these may have on trade and 
corruption within the states.  
 While other factors may also be brought up as points of discussion, such as 
quantitative easing and market flows, these are beyond the scope of the hypothesis and 
may warrant further study not in line with the scope of the thesis.  The use of percentage 
growth in Chapter IV helped reduce the potential bias presented by these factors, as it 
accounts for the consistent practice by each state of these methods of currency 
manipulation. 
 The first concept which is crucial to the hypothesis is whether a country can be 
considered democratic and if it trades with other democratic states. In this section, I shall 
present the states which are democratic, while in the upcoming chapters I will cover the 
main trade partners of states and whether they too are considered democracies.  
 Chart D1 uses the Global Democracy Ranking to define each state as democratic 
or not. The strength and viability of the data provided is based on the research done by 
David Campbell in his work The Basic Concept for the Democratic Ranking of the  
Quality of Democracy (Campbell, 2008) and uses specific variables in line with those 
chosen to explain democracy in this thesis. Furthermore, Campbell delineates a crucial 
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point to our thesis: as of 1990, the majority form of government in the world has rapidly 
become democratic, however the quality of these democracies is a focal issue to the 
argument. As Campbell points out,  
Currently ( as of 2008) only three governments in the world do not self-
identify themselves in their official de jure understanding as 
democracies...Thus the hypothesis can be set up for discussion that 
democracy, as of 1990, represents the dominant global regime type 
(Campbell 2008, pg. 6). 
Due to this fact, rather than argue for there to be trade between a democratic and non- 
democratic state on the basis of self-identification, it is rather opportune to utilize a 
system of ranking order to determine how democratic a state is and to assess the validity 
of the state relating to its form of government. With this in mind, the values which 
represent democracies are crucial in narrowing the argument. 
 Campbell argues that  three main elements exist to define democracy in modern 
times : freedom, equality and control (Campbell 2008, pg.30). Each of these elements is 
directly linked to the way a democracy holds elections and thus to how the democracy 
functions. The data is also an aggregate of studies conducted by Freedom House and 
analyzes the way democracies treat minorities, women and its other citizens. 
 Furthermore Democracy Ranking uses a nominal ranking system to delineate the 
democratic index of states. Their parameters for this statistic are as follows: 50% of the 
weight tied to the ranking is determined by the variable relating to political elements, 
with the remaining 50% of the weight subdivided in the variables of gender, economy, 
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knowledge, health and environment (democracyranking.org 2014).  These measures 
account for the policies which states enact and measure the variables of freedom, equality 
and control to determine how a government acts towards its citizens. 
 Due to the complexity of the data provided, I have chosen to codify the ranking 
system into a nominal variable: a 1 indicating a democracy, a 2 indicating a state with 
democratic institutions but issues tied to the core concepts provided by the thesis and a 3 
indicating a state lacking the requisites to be truly considered a democracy. 
 The importance of analyzing the form of government is a robustness check to the 
hypothesis proposed: given that democracies tend to be more transparent and are more 
likely to trade with one another, accounting for the form of government may aid in 
reducing bias that may arise and may facilitate an analysis of trade partners in the 
upcoming sections. Furthermore it provides additional data to further subdivide the 
information present in Chart B1.  
 Chart D1 will also analyze if states are considered as developed or not in 
accordance to information provided by the World Bank and the International Money 
Fund (IMF) relating to development. The global indicators the World Bank uses are 
complex and based on an analysis of Gross Domestic Product per capita, poverty indexes, 
population growth, disease control and infrastructure gross. For the sake of the argument, 
the thesis will simplify the findings to ensure that the data is relevant to the scope of the 
study. 
 The importance of acknowledging if a state can be considered developed is crucial 
to account for the amount of trade and the propensity the state may have to corruption. 
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States which are developing may in fact be more likely to be corrupt.  
 Furthermore trade may be diminished due to this fact and due to the industrial 
level of their businesses and their trading products.  The data will be codified by a value 
of Y denominating a developing state and a value of N denoting a state which is 
considered developed. Chart D1 will then be used in conjunction with the graphs present 
in Chapter 4 to analyze state trade interaction in the upcoming chapters and see if form of 
government and development play a crucial role in altering the potential findings of the 
thesis. 
Chart D1 : Chart of Democratic and Developing States  
Country Democratic Developed 
Germany 1 Yes 
France 1 Yes 
Japan 1 Yes 
Canada 1 Yes 
USA 1 Yes 
Spain  1 Yes 
South Korea 1 Yes 
Mexico 2 No 
Italy 1 Yes 
Greece 2 Yes 
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Country Democratic Developed 
Argentina 2 No 
Portugal 1 Yes 
India 3 No 
South Africa 2 No 
D.R. Of Congo 3 No 
Morocco 3 No 
Nigeria 3 No 
Brazil 2 No 
Russia 3 No 
Ukraine 3 No 
China 3 No 
9
 
 The information that can be initially interpreted from Chart D1 suggests that most 
states which are developing tend to be either non-democratic or rather somewhat 
democratic. What this suggests is that developing states, as a whole, may be considered 
less transparent and thus more prone to corruption due to their form of government.  
 The important facet to take from this is reliant on the concept of the measurements 
provided by the IMF and the World Bank: decreased GDP per capita, as an example, is a 
                                                 
9 Democracyranking.org 
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good indicator of poverty but not necessarily a clear identifier of corruption. The main 
tool for measurement, as stated by the IMF, is Gross Domestic Capital overall to see if a 
state is considered developing or not: while there may be some biases with using a simple 
methodology to ascertain the developing state of a country, for the sake of the thesis an 
analysis of the data provided by the IMF and the World Bank will be used.  
 Furthermore, due to their status as developing states, most non-democratic states 
may be prone to decreased amounts of trade due to the concepts tied to developing 
economies relating to GDP per capita. Poverty and disease may also be further issues 
these states face, which may further notions of the developing status of the states 
mentioned. 
 States such as Japan, the United States and Germany tend to support the 
hypothesis proposed: as democratic and developed states, their volume of trade and CPI 
averages provide some of the highest means and volume of trade. This shows support to 
the proposed concept that a democratic form of government aids the improved Corruption 
Perception Index of a state, while being developed may increase the volume of trade. 
 States such as Ukraine, Mexico, India and Argentina present a further interesting 
look at states which can be considered somewhat democratic. Each state in charts A1 and 
B1 present very different data, which supports the notion that trade with democratic states 
may push for economic development. This will be further analyzed in the upcoming 
chapters. 
 It is important to denote, however, that the means of the Corruption Perception 
Index of each of these states tends to be, when accounting for each state's region, within 
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the middle of the means of states. What this may point to is the fact that governmental 
sway may cause for these states to have larger ranges and standard deviations in relation 
to their CPI scores, showing more of a sway in how transparent the state may be over 
time.  
 Not only, but trade interaction with democratic and non-democratic states may 
also account for the reason many of these states have oscillating CPI scores.  
 China, as an example, while being a non-democratic developing state, tends to be 
considered a large global trader. However, the means of its transparency index is lower 
than other states. Furthermore, China is a large global trader which interacts 
economically with other democratic states: due to this reason, a growth of transparency is 
to be expected within the state. 
 What this suggests is that while being non-democratic may not affect trade, it does 
affect the Corruption Perception Index of a state. In a similar fashion, it is not definite 
that developing states trade at a reduced volume than developed states.   
 In a similar fashion, many states in the Asian region seem to follow a similar 
trend: Russia, India and South Korea are all considered developing economies by the 
standards set out by the IMF, while some being large international trade entities.  
 The importance of beginning to subdivide the information in relation to these 
parameters is crucial: by seeing how democracies, developing states and non-democratic 
states interact, the correlation between trade and transparency can be shown. For this 
reason, a regional approach may allow for a division which bases itself on eliminating 
biases due to trading bloc policies and at the same time seeing how each state chooses to 
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trade.  
 Europe tends to be a developed sectors, with Eastern European states not 
members of the European Union being a point of discussion. The closeness to the 
developing Asian continent may be a reason for this: furthermore many of these states, 
being ex-Soviet bloc states propose an interesting point of analysis for our thesis 
regarding the interaction between Russia and Europe.  
 The Americas tend to divide themselves geographically, with the United States 
and Canada as democratic developed states and Mexico, Argentina and Brazil as 
developing states. The interplay of developing and developed states will be fundamental 
to the analysis and provide information relating to the effects this has on CPI and trade.  
 However the major point of interest here will focus on the global trading aspect of 
each of these states and the interactions of inter-regional trade. The Americas tend to also 
be a large trading bloc, accounting for a large percentage of global trade and 
characterized by mostly developed democratic states.  
 African states, overall, tend to be non-democratic in relation to the data collected 
by Freedom House and Global Democracy and to be developing states. The importance 
of analyzing the region is crucial due to the issues the states face and the fact that most of 
these countries tend to have a lower trade volume, as delineated in chapter IV.  
 Chart D1 helps in providing a division process to analyze data: by providing 
nominal values to add onto our analysis provided in chapter IV, the aim of chapter V is to 
provide depth and control variables to allow for a regional analysis of how states trade 
and the ramifications on transparency these policies have.  
53 
  What this suggests is the importance of analyzing each region and the economic 
policies in place to ensure that the data in chapter IV is correctly analyzed in relation to 
the practices of the states and their trading patterns. While other factors may exist which 
alter the data, a careful look at the trading policies of each region and an analysis of the 
global interplay of whom the states choose to trade with will help provide information 


















Chapter VI : Europe 
 
 Chapter VI analyzes the findings relating to the trade data gathered for the States 
represented in Chapter IV relating to the state part of the European Union and Eastern 
Europe. The goal of the chapter is to show that efforts toward currency, political and 
cultural unification have increased internal trade, which, in turn, have led to EU member 
states becoming more transparent. 
  Furthermore Ukraine will be discussed in relation to its trade profile with both 
Russia and member states of the EU. In order to assert the point, I  use information 
relating to the CPI and growth percentages to show a graph which will serve to support 
the points set forth in the hypothesis.  
 However, it is important to account for the existence of the European Union and 
the policies it has enacted to ensure that the data provided put in perspective the 
economic policies present within the region. Due to the presence of a large trading bloc 
with a unified currency, a brief analysis of the policies enacted by the EU and its effects 
on the states within the region will help advance the analysis of the data provided in 
Chapter IV. 
 The economic goals of the European Union in accordance to its consolidated 
charter, signed in 2003 in Athens, are  
 to promote economic and social progress and a high level of 
employment and to achieve balanced and sustainable development, in 
particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, 
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through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through 
the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a 
single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty 
(Europa.org 2014).  
 The creation of a unified currency zone, the abolition of border tariffs and the 
creation of the ECB (European Central Bank) have pushed for state transparency and the 
formation of regulations relating to trade practices both internal and external to solely 
member states.  
 One of the organizations which has been key to the process of development of the 
modern European Union has been the customs union. The customs union grew from the 
ECSC.  The creation of a customs union has had positive socio-economic effects for 
member countries:  a better system of welfare, accompanied by increased exporting, has 
helped cement and strengthen economies between member countries. However, this in 
turn has isolated non-member countries, creating tensions regarding tariff barriers (Neal 
2007, pg. 43). 
 The protectionist system has led Europe to become lenient to nations that lag 
behind due to the security awarded them. Neal explains that if a lower cost producer 
(such as the U.S., which produced most manufactured goods at the lowest price in the 
world in the 1950s) is excluded from the customs union, then the consumers in the 
customs union will lose while the producers in the customs union will benefit from being 
effectively protected from the lower cost producer ( Neal 2007, pg. 44).  
 The border customs has led to a dramatic change in the perception of euro-zone 
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countries and their trade: sheltered due to fixed pricing and heavily lowered tariffs, the 
successful exporting of products by European countries within the EU has led an 
internalized system of trade. 
 As presented by Marcouiller (2002), the reduction of risk tied to trade in turn 
favors the reduction of tariff costs and promotes trade and transparency. This behavior 
may help in explaining why the states which adhere to the European Union tend to trade 
more and be more transparent.  As Marcoullier delineates,  
 Abundant evidence suggests that transaction costs associated with 
insecure exchange significantly impede international trade. Predation by 
thieves or by corrupt officials generates a price markup equivalent to a 
hidden tax or tariff. These price markups significantly constrain trade 
where legal systems poorly enforce commercial contracts and where 
economic policy lacks transparency and impartiality (Marcoullier 2002, 
pg. 351) 
 This may also help in analyzing the reasons why Ukraine and Greece suffer both 
economically and in their respective CPI scores.  Given the issues with volume of trade 
and access to information relating to trade, states may not wish to trade with Greece. 
 Andrew K. Rose's article One Money, One Market (Rose, 2000)  provides 
supporting evidence to the importance of a unified currency has had on transparency 
within the European Union. By promoting trade within the European Union, Rose's 
article supports the idea that allowing for a system of increased trade, in this case by a 
group of developed democratic states, supports an increase in transparency and a 
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decrease in corruption.  
 As Rose states, “Even after taking a host of other considerations into account, 
countries that share a common currency engage in substantially higher international 
trade” (Rose 2000, pg.33). While currency unification is beyond the scope of the thesis, it 
is fundamental to account for this variable in describing why EU states may have higher 
trade indexes than other countries selected for this study. The increasing unification of 
trade within Europe pushes for transparency by instituting further organizations which are 
in charge of assuring that trade may occur in a safe manner between member states. 
 Now that the European Union and its internal systems have been discussed, it is 
important to show data from chapter 4 relating to the states that will be discussed in this 
section. Ukraine will be included and, as mentioned previously, will be a point of 
discussion. Graph E1 represents the data in this case, portraying CPI score and trading 













 An initial assessment of the data provides results similar to those found when 
subdividing states by their average mean CPI score: states with similar CPI scores tend to 
have a similar growth over time. Interesting to note in the data series is Italy in 2013, 
which went from a CPI score of 42 to 69. While this data point may be an accountable 
error due to internal government changes, in a similar fashion the economic growth of the 
state had an increase from its negative growth in the previous year. Graph E1.1 will look 
at the gross volume of trade to aid in the analysis: by providing this data, it will offer 






                                                 
10 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database ; http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
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 The two charts allow for the following points to be made: most European Union 
states tend to be more transparent than those which are not part. Greece, as an outlier, is 
not the case, however it also suffers decreased trading. Ukraine performs as expected: it 
has low trading by volume, and while it follows percentage growth patterns similar to 
other states, it is also the state with the lowest CPI score overall.  
 Greece follows a similar pattern: while a member of the European Union, the fact 
that his has low trade volume may affect the transparency of the state. The weakness of 
the Greek financial and governmental approach has been brought to light by its joining 
the EU and having to adhere to standards set by strong democratic and economically 
                                                 
11 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database ; http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
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sound states, such as Germany and France. This has caused the collapse of Greek 
infrastructure. However the blame is in allowing Greece to join: a Bloomberg article 
quotes former European Central Bank Chief Otmar Issing, stating that,  
Greece was only able to join the euro through deception and the currency 
bloc’s leaders have been “too polite” ever since to deploy adequate 
sanctions that could have averted the region’s debt crisis (Bloomberg, 
2011).   
 Greece, even being within the European Union, has a lower CPI and trade volume 
due to the fact that practices of deception have caused  insecurity in explaining Greece 
has grown over time. Further evidence will be provided to explain why trading partners 
whom Greece has chosen may further affect the data shown in Graph E1 and E1.1 
 Italy presents some interesting information: while its CPI score is not significantly 
higher than those of Greece, it has a larger trading volume than states such as Portugal 
and Spain, both which present a higher overall CPI score. In 2013, however, its CPI score 
rose dramatically: this may due to internal governmental structures, which may bias the 
data. For this reason it would make sense that Italy's CPI score may have been negatively 
affected due to political instability within the state rather than by trade volume changes.  
  To further the analysis, I shall use the World Trade Organization's country profile 
to see what state each country majorly trades with. This will assist explaining whether 
states within Europe tend to trade with democratic entities and if they are considered 
developed or not in accordance to our parameters (Appendix A).  
 Most of the states within Europe favor trading with the European Union as their 
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main import and export of manufactured goods; thus for the states which do so, it would 
make sense that their CPI scores tend to deviate accordingly as the majority of trade 
occurs with developed democracies.  
 France and Germany provide a strong correlation to our proposed hypothesis: 
both states have increasing trade with a strong CPI score which sways as economic 
changes affect the states. While both states strongly trade with China, the amount is 
negligible in comparison to the overall focus both states have on trade within the 
European Union.  
 The outlier to this is Ukraine, who tends to trade significantly more with Russia. 
Important to note is that while Ukraine has trade agreements with the EU, it is not a 
member state. This may help explain the reasons behind why Ukraine has such a low CPI 
score: due to trading with a non-democratic entity, it is possible that shared economic 
policies with Russia and support from the state may cause its CPI score to decrease.  
 In a similar fashion, Greece and Italy are major importers from Russia and China: 
what this suggests is that trade with non-democratic states may damage the CPI score of 
states who engage in large trading volume. Both states tend to have internal fiscal and 
political issues which may alter the information and be beyond the scope of the thesis.  
 Spain and Portugal serve to further this argument: while their trading volume may 
be lower than that of Italy, their trade partners tend to focus solely on democratic states 
and majorly focus on trade within the European Union. This in turn suggests that while 
volume of export and imports is correlated with transparency, the fact that trade partners 
are democratic is crucial for a correct analysis of the data.  
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 Europe as a region tends to support the hypothesis when applied to member states 
of the European Union who tend to trade with democratic states. Italy and Greece are two 
points of argument which may provide insight to fundamental factors which should be 
analyzed to ensure that correlation between trade growth and transparency is not due to 



















Chapter VII: Asia 
 
 Chapter VII analyzes the Asian region and assesses some of the focal players in 
the region. This chapter will include an analysis of Russia, China, Japan, India and South 
Korea.  
 Similar to Chapter VI, an analysis of the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement is looked 
at as a source of information relating to the possible implications that this has on the data. 
Furthermore, I analyze the WTO country reports to assess if each state is trading with 
developing countries and democratic ones.  
 The Asia Pacific Trade Agreement,  formerly known as the Bangkok Agreement, 
was founded in November 2005. Its role, similar to the European Union, was to create 
economic tariff concessions to member states and allow for facilitated trade within the 
region. Of the states present in the discussion, China, India and South Korea are all part 
of the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (ESCAP, 2005).  
The goals, as set out by the agreement, are to: 
...promote economic development through a continuous process of trade 
expansion among the developing member countries of ESCAP and to 
further international economic co-operation through the adoption of 
mutually beneficial trade liberalization measures consistent with their 
respective present and future development and trade needs (ESCAP 2005, 
pg. 4). 
 One of the fundamental points of the agreement is to promote the growth of the 
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member states which are considered developing economies by facilitating internal trade. 
Due to this fact, APTA is fundamentally focused on the promotion of trade rather than 
unification of currency, social norms or other facets which were proposed for the EU. 
Furthermore, it also promotes external trade with developing states, with concessions 
regarding allowance for exclusion of trade tariffs with developing countries.  As Article 7, 
titled Special Concessions to Least Developed Country Participating States,  highlights: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of article 5 of this Agreement, any 
Participating State may grant to least developed country Participating 
States special concessions which shall apply to all least developed country 
Participating States and shall not be extended to other Participating States. 
These special concessions shall be included in the National List of 
Concessions of the preference-giving Participating State (ESCAP 2005, 
pg.5)  
 An initial assessment of the goals of the APTA shows a willingness of member 
states to facilitate trade coming from developing states. What this may suggest, in 
accordance to our hypothesis, is that increased trade may strengthen CPI scores within 
the region.  
 Furthermore, it is important to note that Russia is not included within the APTA. 
This will become a focal point of argument in the upcoming analysis of the data. Not 
only is this one point, but the trade relation between the United States and Japan is also 
examined.  
 Having assessed and analyzed the effects that the APTA may have on member 
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states within the region, it is now fundamental to begin an analysis of the data provided in 
Chapter IV relating to the Asian region. Graph F1 will portray the data relating to the 
percentage trade growth and Corruption Perception Index of states over time.  Graph F1.1 
supports the data by providing the raw trading volume of the states over time.  
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Graph F1.1 : Asia Trade Volume Over Time
13
 
 The findings shown in the graphs yield useful information relating to the 
correlation between trade and transparency. It is important to start the analysis by 
pointing out that of the chosen states, the only developed countries, according to the 
World Bank and IMF, are Japan and South Korea.  
 While Japan has the highest CPI score over time, it is China which shows the 
most trade by volume: this posits an interesting point of discussion relating to the effects 
the form of government and development status have on transparency. China is in fact 
both a non-democratic and developing state, and while data relating to its CPI score seem 
indicative of these facts, the fact that it remains one of the largest traders globally goes 
against the proposed hypothesis.  
 While its CPI score is not the lowest in the region, it does not support the 
proposed hypothesis. Not only is the fact that by volume China trades the most, but the 
                                                 
13 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database; http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
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economic effects of trade on transparency tend to be less drastic on China than other 
states: in 2009, as displayed in Graph F1, China suffered the least negative growth, 
decreasing trade by only 13.88%. Similar to findings suggested in chapter IV, it seems 
that non-democratic states and developing states suffer less CPI score changes due to 
trading volume changes. 
 This information will be crucial in assessing what effects trade has on states in the 
case in which a state is either non-democratic or developing. Russia, as an example, has a 
larger trading volume than other states, but the transparency of its government and its 
corruption index are not correlated directly with these findings. Russia, similar to China, 
is considered a non-democratic developing economy: however one major change is the 
fact that, in accordance to information provided by the WTO country profiles, its largest 
export and import routes tend to be with the European Union.  
 While its largest trade partnership is with the European Union, it is also heavily 
invested in trade with China: it is interesting to then observe that it is Russia in fact which 
has the lowest CPI of the region. Furthermore, Russia's correlation tends to mimic that of 
Ukraine: as Mikhail Balaev presents in his work The Effects of International Trade on 
Democracy: A Panel Study of the Post-Soviet (2009), Russia utilized its economic 
prowess to leverage its international position. Balaev furthers the point by presenting 
evidence to the historic actions Russia used to gain such power:  
 In the 1990s, Russia was occasionally reducing the energy supplies 
to Ukraine, thus forcing it to join various security and economic 
agreements within the CIS. In 1997, the Russian government forfeited the 
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debt of Belarus in exchange for Belarus’s entering into a formal union 
with Russia. The combination of the post-Soviet nations’ economic 
dependence on Russia and the frequent political decisions that favor 
Russian policy leads to the conclusion that Russia uses its economic ties as 
a tool to increase its political power internationally and to rebuild a form 
of hegemony in the former Soviet geopolitical space (Balaev 2009, 
pg.341) 
 What this shows is not in support of the hypothesis, as trade with democratic 
states does not seem to help Russian transparency. This is in stark contrast to China, who 
has had a constant increase of its CPI score as its trade routes with the United States have 
increased.  
 Mikael's article “The Effects of International Trade on Democracy: A Panel Study 
of the Post-Soviet World-System”(Mikael 2009) help to show the effects that internal 
political dispute and the effects the dismantling of the Soviet Union may have on 
explaining the reduced transparency Russia shows world-wide. As Mikael presents, 
 The problem here is that equal weight is allocated to each dollar 
regardless of the origin of the transaction. In this analysis, all economic 
ties a priori are considered to have the same effect on the nation’s 
domestic politics, which is not true. For example, a one-dollar trade that 
Russia executes with the United States may not carry the same theorized 
political weight as a one-dollar trade with Bolivia or Guatemala. Such 
analytical settings may not be problematic for the analysis of the Western 
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democracies (political equals), but it can create major problems in the 
analysis of less developed countries(Mikael 2009, pg.338). 
 While using a common currency to describe volume of trade may help alleviate 
bias tied to currency value changes, it is important to also acknowledge the political 
effect currency has on developing countries and their ability to compete in an 
international market.  
 As it has been stated, most states in the analysis of chapter VII are considered 
developing states, which, as Mikael points out, may change the way states function 
internationally and the rate at which trade can affect internal political decision making.  
 An analysis of Indian trade patterns will also help to further the concepts Mikael 
brings up. A focus on India is crucial as it provides support to the findings relating to the 
difference that a developing state has on the legitimacy of the hypothesis. With a large 
trading volume and a growing CPI score over time, India is one of the largest regional 
entities both politically and economically.  
 Furthermore, as Rajamaran shows in his work “Fiscal Transparency”, India serves 
as an indicator of how transparency may vary internationally due to the work of internal 
agencies (Rajamaran, 2002).  
 Rajamaran argues that one issue developing states in Asia face is due to fiscal 
transparency and the regulations set forth by the IMF in defining how states present 
information relating to their markets (Rajamaran 2002, pg. 4885).  
 The issue is that in developing countries, systems of reporting are hard to 
formulate and rely on transparency existing between the internal private industry and the 
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efforts of the government to appear fiscally transparent in an international market. This in 
turn can affect the perceived perception governments have of other states and alters their 
internal political reporting standards.  
 Similar to the fiscal indiscipline shown by Greece, Italy and Spain in Europe, 
developing countries tend to reduce reporting to hide potential negative growth in the 
state to better appease international investors (Rajamaran 2002, pg. 4888). 
 Having identified potential biases tied to developing and non-democratic states, it 
is now important to turn the attention of our analysis to Japan and South Korea, the two 
democratic states within chapter VII.  
 It is important to note that Japan is the state with the highest CPI score in the 
region and is the second largest exporter and importer. Japan as a state supports our 
hypothesis, as both its volume of trade and CPI score have grown positively over time.  
However, in the last 2 years Japan has seen both a decrease in volume of trade and CPI 
score.  
 The information provided by the World Bank relating to Japan's trading habits 
also point to its largest trade partner being the United States, another developed 
democratic state. Not only is Japan a state which predominantly trades with the United 
States, but it also shares strong defensive and economic treaties with the country. Such a 
strong connection, both economically and socially, to the United States may serve as 
evidence to the importance trading is in reinforcing transparency between democratic 
states. 
 Japan is both a democratic and developed state and similar to the evidence 
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provided for European States, it seems to support a correlation between growth of volume 
of trade and growth in economic transparency. 
 Furthermore, it is important to note that even the states which tend to correlate 
less than others, as an example China, still have a growth of CPI score as trade increases. 
As graph F1.1 demonstrates, it is still possible to show that transparency increases as 
trade does, even if the change in growth is something to note. Furthermore, internal 
political issues may present a further bias to why transparency may be lower in given 
years. In a similar fashion, the recession in 2009 is another phenomenon which alters the 
data and is beyond the scope of the thesis.  
 In a similar fashion, South Korea follows a similar pattern of growth and also has 
a decrease in CPI score and volume of trade in 2012 and 2013.  One crucial difference is 
the fact that, according to IMF and World Bank GPI per capita, South Korea is not 
considered to be a developed country as of yet.  
 Strong political tensions with North Korea have also brought up discussion to the 
legitimacy of describing South Korea as democratic. This may be reflected in the fact that 
South Korea is within the mid-quartiles of CPI scores both in the region and globally. It 
once again shows the importance that both the form of government and status of 
economic development may have on determining the transparency of a state. 
 However, both states support our proposed hypothesis. Yet the divergent 
information non-democratic developing states provide may point to potential external 
sources which may dictate what factor affect transparency globally for states.  An 
analysis of Russia and India have helped delineate how volume of trade may not be 
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sufficient a measurement to determine transparency, as described by CPI score. A further 
study relating to South Korea and Japan, however, helped to show that form of 
government and form of government do matter in assessing the effects volume of trade 
has on transparency. It is crucial to acknowledge, however, that as trade increases for the 



















Chapter VIII : Africa 
 
 In this chapter, I analyze how African states are examples of countries with a high 
corruption index, low transparency and also have the lowest overall trade. Africa is also 
composed mostly of developing countries which deal primarily in raw resource trade. 
This renders their condition interesting as their trade volume may be high, but the costs at 
which they are selling their product is not. I also define which African states can truly be 
considered democracies shall be analyzed. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge 
that the data shows that reduced CPI indexes means that growth in trade may affect states 
differently. 
 Furthermore,  various trade treaties and organizations exist in Africa: The 
Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for 
Eastern & Southern Africa (COMESA) and the West African Trade Organization 
(WATO). While the relevance of treaties has been ascertained in previous sections, it is 
unlikely that this will be relevant in the study of the chosen states.  
 Each is member of multiple trade agreements and the rules governing each are 
beyond the scope of the analysis. Instead, an analysis of the concept of most favored 
nation will be provided to explain some of the factors which may affect trade with 
developing states.  
 The existence of a multitude of trade agreements presents an initial divergence 
from the other regions we have looked at: most African states in fact do not primarily 
trade within the continent, but rather do so globally. In stark contrast to many other states, 
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trade agreements between African states are aimed at aiding international competition 
and are generally enforced through the World Trade Organization's  most favored nation 
clause (Hurd 2011, pg. 41).  
  A further reason to choose to analyze the WTO here is for a problem with African 
states reporting accurate data relating to their economic practices. Due to the low CPI 
scores of most countries involved and the fact that the treaties may not be truly enforced, 
it may aid the analysis to focus on the policies enacted by the WTO. 
 The importance of equal opportunity to trade is set forth in Article II, stating that 
“each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties’ 
treatment no less favorable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement” (Hurd 2011, pg. 63).   
 However, it is Article III of the World Trade Organization charter which most 
affects developing countries. Declaring that  
the products of the territory of any other contracting party shall not be 
subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of 
any other kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products (Hurd 2011, pg. 63), 
  Article III regulates tariffs and sets the amount which may be charged for the 
export and import of goods. While these may theoretically allow for the equal trade of 
products, developmental costs, industrialization and diversity of products must be 
accounted for. The production of goods by states which have a diversified basis of trade 
is favored. By equalizing tariffs set for similar products, Article III allows for developed 
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economies to not have their prices undermined by cheaper production costs. However, it 
also sets forth a barrier for states which specialize in an export, forcing them to have to 
sell the product at a price which may not be beneficial to the state. 
 With a preliminary analysis of the WTO and its effects on trade with most favored 
nation, what follows is an analysis of the data presented in chapter VI relating to African 
States. Graphs G1 and G1.1 show, respectively, the CPI score and trade percentage 
growth over time and the overall trade of product over time.  





                                                 




Graph G1.1 :African Trade Volume Over Time
15
 
 Of the countries analyzed in Africa, one apparent issue arises: the trade volumes 
of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, according to the World Trade 
Organization, were estimate sums based on other reporting. Of the states analyzed, except 
for South Africa, none of the other states met the criteria to be defined as democracies. 
Furthermore the African region is composed of mostly developing states. These factors 
are crucial in understanding why the data, when applied to African states, does not 
correlate as strongly as in other cases. 
 It is important to note that the Democratic Republic of Congo also lacks CPI 
indexes for 2001 and 2002. Furthermore, an analysis of the country profile, as reported 
by the WTO, does not show the major trade partners for the state. What this points to is 
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issues within the states with reporting. This affects both the volume of trade and the CPI 
of the states presented above. A similar issue presents itself with Morocco and Nigeria, 
which once again may delineate an issue with the application of the hypothesis. 
 The difficulty to ascertain if a correlation exists can be caused by a multitude of 
factors affecting the states, but for the sake of the thesis, the argument will be put forth 
that due to low trade volume, transparency was not a concern of the states at the time. 
However both Nigeria and Morocco do show a positive correlation between volume of 
trade and CPI index, even if the changes in this case are minimal.   
 An exception to the rule is the leading state in both CPI and trade in the region, 
South Africa. Graph G1 shows interesting patterns of growth for South Africa: while 
most other states tend to have a decline in economic prosperity during the 2008 to 2009 
period, South Africa shows an increase in growth of import trade. Not only, but during 
the same period, the transparency of the country tends to decrease. 
 An argument can be made that internal activities, such as the setting up for the 
World Cup, could have affected the economic and political infrastructure of the country. 
Another issue which requires further study is the effects that colonialism has had on the 
developments of states within the region. While this issue merits further study, it is 
beyond the scope of the thesis.  
 South Africa is also a large trade partner of the European Union, which may be a 
reason for why the state tends to provide better information and have a larger trade 
volume. However the data presented does not support the hypothesis presented. As 
previously mentioned, states with low CPI scores do not seem affected as much by the 
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volume of trade as they should have.  
 The importance of analyzing the African region and to point out the difficulties in 
determining if a correlation exists provides insight into issues which exist with the thesis. 
States which are not transparent do not provide accurate information relating to their 



















Chapter IX: The Americas  
 
 Chapter IX analyzes the data gathered relating to North and South America. In 
this region, I include Canada, the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. I shall 
discuss how the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) affect trade and transparency within the 
region. Furthermore, an analysis of the differing economic and political models present in 
North and South America will be used to present evidence supporting the findings 
presented in the previous chapters.  
 The United States will be a focal part of this chapter. As one of the largest 
economies in the world, the United states is a crucial player in pushing for transparency. 
Acting as the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the 
United States is able to influence the way trade agreements and other bloc entities, such 
as the European Union, choose to act. Mexico is analyzed as it presents an interesting 
case as part of both NAFTA and LAFTA. 
 The North American Free Trade Association includes Canada, the United States of 
America and Mexico. The treaty was set up in 1994 to facilitate commerce. Its goals, as 
set out by its charter, are to  
eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, 
goods and services between the territories of the Parties; promote 
conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; increase substantially 
investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; provide adequate 
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and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
each Party's territory; create effective procedures for the implementation 
and application of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the 
resolution of disputes; and establish a framework for further trilateral, 
regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits 
of this Agreement (www.ustr.org 2014). 
 Similar to the guidelines set out in other treaties discussed in the previous 
chapters, the aim of the treaty is to ease regional product mobility and facilitate favorable 
trading conditions for member states.  It is important to note that “...the NAFTA countries 
(Canada and Mexico), were the top two purchasers of U.S. exports in 2013. (Canada 
$300.3 billion and Mexico $226.2 billion)” (ustr.org 2014).   
 This delineates is the goal of countries that join the treaty: to have ease of trade 
with the United States.  However, beyond the favoring of trade, the goals of political and 
economic inter-relationship are in no way as closely tied to the agreement as those set 
forth by the European Union. 
 Having looked at NAFTA, it is now fundamental to understand the logic behind 
the Latin American Free Trade Association, of which Brazil, Mexico and Argentina are 
members. In a similar fashion, the Latin American Free Trade Association functions as a 
way to facilitate trade. Originating from the Treaty of Montevideo in 1980, the goals of 
LAFTA are to 
... pursue the integration process leading to promote the harmonious and 
balanced socio-economic development of the region, and to that effect 
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they hereby institute the Latin American Integration Association ( referred 
to as the Association), with headquarters in the city of Montevideo, 
Eastern Republic of Uruguay. The long-term objective of such process 
shall be the gradual and progressive establishment of a Latin American 
common market (www.sice.oas.org 1980). 
 It is important to point out that the treaty, similar to NAFTA, does not account for 
any integration beyond easing market accessibility by member states. As Article 10 of the 
treaty points out, “Trade agreements are exclusively aimed towards trade promotion 
among member countries, and shall be subject to the specific rules to be established for 
that purpose” (www.sice.oas.org 1980). The exclusivity clause presented functions as a 
way to narrow the scope of the agreement and ensure that it does not affect the internal 
functioning of member states.  
 The goal of both treaties is not based on promotion of transparency, but rather the 
promotion of trade: both agreements function in a manner which is solely aimed at 
assisting the trade of goods. Not only is this the aim, but NAFTA focuses its attention on 
allowing member states ease of trade with the United States specifically. This is 
fundamental in analyzing the role the USA takes in relation to the other countries 
discussed in the section.  
 With this in mind, an analysis of the data presented in chapter IV relating to the 
Americas is necessary to understand the effects trade has on the selected states. Graphs 
H1 and H1.1 show, respectively, the CPI score and trade percentage growth over time and 
the overall trade of product over time.   
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16 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database; http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
17 World Trade Organization (2014). Time Series Statistics Database; http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
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 An initial assessment of the graphs provided yields supporting evidence to the 
legitimacy of the theory. Almost all states show a growth of CPI score in accordance to 
their volume of trade and their economic growth. As an example, Canada has the leading 
CPI score and shows economic growth relating to the sways in its score. Furthermore, the 
United States shows a decrease of transparency in the period of time during the recession, 
which is indicative of a correlation between our two variables. 
 What is interesting is that states which tend to trade mostly with the United States 
in the region tend to follow a similar trend line: both Canada and Mexico show a similar 
growth pattern of CPI and of trade volume. This is different from the data provided for 
South American states: Argentina and Brazil, while possessing similar economic growth 
and volume of trade, have divergent standards relating to their CPI score. What this may 
point out is a point made in previous chapters: states which are developing may have a 
different correlation due to factors tied into the concept of development.  
 The divergent line for the data is the subdivision of countries part of NAFTA and 
those part of LAFTA, with Mexico being an interesting data point as it is a member of 
both. It is noticeable that the CPI scores of Argentina and Mexico are similar, however 
their trade pattern is different. The fact that Mexico trades at a substantially higher rate 
than Argentina may be a factor: due to this, Mexico's CPI score is slightly higher. 
Abraham Benavides (2006) article “Transparency and Public Administration in Mexico: 
How the Enactment of a Law Is Changing Culture” provides further evidence to the 
reasons why Mexico may be affected by internal facets. As Benavides highlights,  
84 
 Recent elections in Mexico, despite their tumultuous appearance, 
have been more participatory and have reflected progress in Mexico's 
culture of openness and transparency as opposed to its traditional culture 
of secrecy and corruption (Benavides 2006, pg. 462). 
 The internal state of Mexico is tumultuous and promotes corruption. While the 
argument can be made that this is a factor which affects CPI score, an explanation 
relating to the possibility is sufficient for the scope of the thesis. This also further 
solidifies evidence relating to the goals set out by NAFTA: importance is set on trade and 
not the transparency of its member states.  This helps reaffirm the causal link that trade 
has on transparency, by showing that is volume of commerce which affects CPI.  
  However Brazil has a higher CPI score than both but trades less than Mexico. In 
looking at the percentage growths of these two states, an important piece of data can be 
observed:  Brazil's growth factor is higher than that of Mexico. What this may suggest is 
as a state grows economically and internally, the CPI score will also grow to allow for the 
continuation of trade.  
 Furthermore, the increase in CPI score in 2013 can also, as with South Africa, be 
attributed to government policies relating to the FIFA world cup. While the inverse was 
true for South Africa, one reason for this might be that Brazil heavily trades with the 
United States as presented in the WTO country reports. 
 Halter et als article, Transparency to Reduce Corruption?: Dropping Hints for 
Private Organizations in Brazil, provides an interesting point of view relating to how 
internal business ethics may affect the corruption and transparency of Brazil. As 
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presented by Halter, 
 In the past years, news reports regarding the violation of business 
ethics have created doubts about the practical application of principles of 
corporate governance in Brazil. Some legal systems seem to be more 
effective than others in inducing greater commitment to legal compliance 
by the corporation (Halter et al 2009, pg.374).  
 Internal issues with corruption seem to be prevalent within Central and South 
America: what this may suggest is that developing states may be less likely to be truly 
democratic and furthermore have a generally lower CPI score. 
 The United States is a focal state to the argument of the Americas: being the 
largest trading force in the block, it is also at the center of the NAFTA agreement and is 
one of the major trading partners of most states. The fact that the United States is such an 
immense developed democratic economic power is crucial to the proposed hypothesis. 
 The data relating to its trade patterns tend to correlate economic growth and 
transparency, while providing support to the concepts that democratic states tend to be 
more transparent. Furthermore, data relating to the United States supports the findings 
relating to the difference between developing and developed states. Changes in 
transparency of democracies tend to correlate stronger with economic growth.  
 One of the major effects of this interaction is the political pressure which a state 
can exert by promoting trade. As presented by James Morrow et al (1998) in the article 
“The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers”,   
 ..Results indicate that states whose interests are closest to those of 
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the United States, as measured by similarity of voting in the United 
Nations, have higher levels of trade with the United States than other 
states (Morrow et al 1998, pg.650) 
 By using trade as a means to an end, Morrow argues that conflict is 
avoidable by encouraging commerce. This does explain why countries who tend 
to trade with democratic states tend to have an increase in their CPI rating and 
overall transparency. The role of the United States in the region is clear: it acts as 
a crucial entity in the promotion of transparency, and as such it makes sense that 
states that majorly trade with the US tend to have similar CPI fluctuations. 
 Chapter IX provides crucial information on analyzing the interplay of democratic, 
non-democratic states, developing and developed states. Not only, but it presents 














 A thorough analysis of the data provided has yielded results which are supportive 
of the hypothesis proposed. However, it was not possible to ascertain causality, but rather 
a correlation between trade and transparency.  
 Multiple factors exist which affect corruption and transparency in states: form of 
government, economic development, internal infrastructure and internal business 
activities are just some examples of possible elements which exist that may affect how a 
state appears to other states in the international scene. For this reason, caution must be 
used when ascertaining if the results of the study are fundamentally true. Potential issues 
exist with variables that were not accounted for in the original hypothesis.  
 Due to the complex nature of economic relations and the existence of non-
governmental actors, it is difficult to fully encompass trade as a single entity. The scope 
of the thesis, however, was to argue simply if the increased global trade of goods would 
have an effect on transparency. While this may present issues relating to the robustness of 
the data, an analysis of the sample states yields information relating to a correlate value 
existing between the trade in products and transparency. The difficulty then lies in how to 
measure such a value. Due to the enormous possibilities and interplay of economic 
elements which exist, it became necessary to conduct the analysis in a simplified form.  
 However, given the advantages increased trade has, why do states choose not 
increase their own transparency? Glennester's (2008) article “Does Transparency Pay?” 
proposes the conception that states may choose to become more transparent as a means to 
88 
continue prosperous trade. As Glennester points out, 
..it is natural to ask why all governments do not adopt these (transparency) 
reforms. One answer is that a country weighs the benefit of lower trading 
costs against the loss of discretion on the part of policymakers that comes 
with more transparency (Glennester 2008, pg.206). 
 As discussed in Chapter VII, Russia is an example of a state which had utilized 
the lack of information relating to its political dialogue to enforce favorable economic 
treaties with states such as Ukraine. Now, that has appeared to have backfired as Ukraine, 
in an attempt to begin trading more with the European Union, has fallen to civil war. 
Other countries, such as Italy, face internal issues which render measuring transparency 
difficult. This is not to say that other states do not act in a similar fashion: as discussed in 
chapter IX, the United States, as an example, uses trade to leverage support within 
international organizations such as the United Nations.  
 However the importance of promoting state transparency through trade is 
something which should be considered as a means to further democratization and its 
advantages. As Kristin Lord (1999) in his article “The Surprising Logic of Transparency” 
argues,  
 It is possible that both very high transparency, because it accurately 
signals intentions, and very low transparency, because it prevents the 
"noise" of domestic politics from overwhelming diplomatic signals, allow 
states to defuse crises. If accurate, only moderate transparency would 
exacerbate crises because it would allow enough information to confuse 
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the opponent, but not enough to clarify peaceful intention (Lord 1999, pg. 
335).  
 The issue of transparency is one which interplays directly with the manner in 
which states interact with each other; the fact that trade seems to affect how a state 
decides to act has important implications regarding the value of commerce.  
 By demonstrating a correlation between trade and transparency, it becomes 
evident that commerce might be more than a way of growing states economically, but a 
tool to aid in the development of stability in the international anarchic system. A push 
towards aiding development and promoting commerce facilitate dialogue and may allow 
for states to resolve disputes in a peaceful manner. What this implies is that actions, such 
as embargoes or economic sanctions, may not be the best recourse to solving 
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